| "When we reflect on this struggle, we may console | | | | action is authentic or in bad faith. If one blames others |
| ourselves with the full belief, that the war of nature is | | | | for their own action and denies responsibility that action |
| not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally | | | | is inauthentic or done in bad faith. |
| prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the | | | | The Existentialist sees that human condition is that of |
| happy survive and multiply." - Charles Darwin (1). | | | | free commitment. God doesn't exist therefore |
| Darwin of course was unjustified in his belief; fear | | | | humanity is in a state of abandonment with no |
| seems to be the most universal of emotions both for | | | | transcending beings or priori's to guide us. Sartre |
| human beings and the greater animal kingdom. This | | | | commits to the notion of individual freedom as the only |
| emotion though is not simply reserved in human life in | | | | human priori but denies that there is any human nature |
| the struggle for existence; we feel fear and anxiety | | | | as a priori because there is only a "human universality |
| when we make choices about the direction of our | | | | of condition" (17). This is a sceptical argument like 'the |
| lives. This is our struggle for meaning. The current | | | | sun rises every morning but how will we know if it will |
| piece will focus on discourses of and relevant to that | | | | rise tomorrow' or in our case 'Man acts in certain |
| struggle and concepts surrounding it. Linking discourses | | | | pattens but how do we know he will tomorrow? " |
| diverse as logic and the Abrahamic religions to find the | | | | Thus because of the uncertainty of our condition |
| structure of this struggle. | | | | human-beings live not only in anguish but in despair, 'if I |
| In 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' Wittgenstein argued | | | | take action in support of a goal, how do I know others |
| that: "Propositions cannot represent the logical form: | | | | will act in support?" This means that despair is the |
| this mirrors itself in the propositions" (2).Thus the logic | | | | emotion that man feels because he acts without hope. |
| of a symbolism be it language or mathematics cannot | | | | To summarise, the point of Sartre's existentialism is to |
| be found outside of that symbolism. Because the logic | | | | give humanity its divinity as its own creator and along |
| of that symbolism is its very structure, its schema. The | | | | with this divinity its responsibility. |
| "propositional sign cannot be contained in itself" (3) but | | | | There is a certain contradiction in this thought, that of a |
| a "sign determines a logical form only together with its | | | | false objective subjective dichotomy. The actions and |
| logical syntactic application" (4). | | | | experiences of every particular individual never seem |
| Language is according to Wittgenstein a series of | | | | to add up to the totality of what is the human |
| atomic propositions about the world; its symbolism is a | | | | experience. If each individual is tied to the concept of |
| picture of the world, of reality and everything that is | | | | existence precedes essence it becomes an objective |
| the case. The truth-argument which a proposition | | | | fact of human experience, not simply a subjective |
| makes is its picture of the world; the truth-value is | | | | phenomena. The Existentialists are right in saying that |
| determined by the ability to provide proofs for the | | | | man lives in anguish, because we have choices and |
| validity of the picture. | | | | responsibility for those choices. For whom he is in |
| Further argument put forward in the Tractatus, "The | | | | relation to the external forces. But they are wrong to |
| limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (5), | | | | preclude the idea of an objective meaning of life. If |
| therefore in following this argument so far Wittgenstein | | | | each particular individual's life is made up of a series of |
| conceives a linguistic limit in our understanding of the | | | | choices about the values to which they affirm and live |
| world. But he further stipulates that "For an answer | | | | for then the root purpose of humanity in the objective |
| which cannot be expressed the question too cannot | | | | sense is the struggle for purpose - for our meaning. |
| be expressed. The riddle does not exist."(6) I.e. if you | | | | Part of this failure by the Sartrean existentialists is that |
| have a question there is an answer, "most questions | | | | their ontological inquiries were carried out under a kind |
| and propositions of the philosophers result from the | | | | of bad faith, under the illusion of a particular |
| fact that we do not understand the logic of our | | | | semi-moralistic theory of authenticity and bad faith. |
| language...And so it is not to be wondered at that the | | | | Their conceptualisation of causality in relation to the |
| deepest problems are really no problems" (7). | | | | individual could not touch upon the notion of conditioning |
| During the second part of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein | | | | or the zone of proximal development because any |
| turns his attention from logical symbolism and the rules | | | | such thing would negate individual responsibility as part |
| by which philosophy must separate sense from | | | | of our nature of being. Individual agency is a |
| senselessness to questions about the meaning of life, | | | | component of the human condition but not to the |
| ethics and religious mysticism. | | | | extent envisioned by the French existentialists, death |
| "The world and life are one" (8), we would be mistaken | | | | for one is normally a decisive decision but not one we |
| if we thought Wittgenstein felt the sense of the world | | | | make. |
| and therefore life was found inside the world and life. | | | | The inevitability of death futures highly in discourses |
| That the Schema of the world would be found in the | | | | surrounding the notions of human life and it's meaning. |
| totality of its particulars, this logic would correlate with | | | | In "At the Gravesite" Kierkegaard likened the nature of |
| the rules set out for a logical symbolism. But we | | | | death's influence on life to scarcity in economics. If a |
| cannot gain from Wittgenstein such consistency of | | | | merchant dumps a shipment of products at sea |
| logic. | | | | because the market is already saturated with a high |
| "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In | | | | supply it creates an artificial scarcity which increases |
| the world everything is as it is and happens as it does | | | | the price of the remaining product. If we did not die and |
| happen. In it there is no value - and if there were, it | | | | life was infinite, then life according to Kierkegaard |
| would be of no value." (9) | | | | would be of little value. This adds an extra dimension |
| It is in this sense that Wittgenstein dissolves the | | | | to our anguish because our ability to affirm life and |
| question of meaning in life, opting out by two common | | | | what we consider worthy values is finite and scarce. |
| techniques used in inadequate philosophical systems. | | | | Camus believed that this was not our first concern; |
| Firstly to look for life's meaning outside of life and in | | | | firstly we must concern ourselves with whether or not |
| conjunction with or separately neglects the internal | | | | the value in life is valuable at all. |
| logic of the philosophical system to render meaning | | | | The first question of a rational person in Camus's mind |
| meaningless. It is with this respect that Wittgenstein | | | | was to be or not to be, the question of suicide. He |
| has similarities with both the theologian and the | | | | very tactfully at the start of 'The Myth of Sisyphus' |
| absurdist, in strake contrast to his grammatical theory | | | | stated his belief that life should be lived and that suicide |
| of meaning. | | | | is absurd in itself, lest some unlucky soul become |
| The impulse of the theologian or mystic is to seek | | | | connived of the correctness of his arguments before |
| otherworldly explanations for worldly questions. Karl | | | | fully completing the text. To understand Camus's ideas |
| Marx famously summarised this impulse as such during | | | | we must understand he detested being called a |
| the introduction of his "Critique of Hegel's philosophy of | | | | "philosopher of the absurd". Expressing his motivation |
| right": | | | | and in 'The Enigma' Camus wrote "Thus one becomes |
| "Religious suffering is the expression of real suffering | | | | a prophet of the absurd. Yet what did I do expect |
| and at the same time the protest against real suffering. | | | | reason about an idea with I found in the streets of my |
| Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the | | | | time?"(18). As one understands now Camus's work |
| heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless | | | | function more as a meditation and open debate then a |
| condition. It is the opium of the people" (10). | | | | complete system of thought. He linked 'absurd |
| Marx goes further to assert that "abolition of religion as | | | | reasoning' with that of Edmund Husserl's |
| people's illusory happiness is the demand for their real | | | | phenomenology in that it "declines to explain the world, |
| happiness" (11). According to this view of religion it | | | | it wants to be merely a description of actual |
| functions as a mere placebo-worldview, where one | | | | experience" (19). The Absurd is best characterised as |
| finds substitutive satisfaction in sacrificing this world for | | | | a mood of a nihilistic nature marred by the disunity of |
| the sake of the after-world. Sigmund Freud went as | | | | universal and particular. This disunity is the same |
| far to characterise religion as a mass delusion or social | | | | objective (universal)-subjective (particular) dichotomy |
| neurosis. "Neurotics" he wrote "create substitutive | | | | which rendered life's meaning in the existentialist |
| satisfaction for themselves in their symptoms, but | | | | systems meaningless. |
| these either create suffering in themselves or become | | | | It was an idea that captivated a generation, but unlike |
| sources of suffering by causing the subjects difficulties | | | | Kierkegaard they found faith deficient, not accepting it |
| in their relations with their surroundings and society" (12). | | | | as an answer to the question of absurdity. Like |
| From the angle of aesthetics, whether an individual | | | | Nietzsche who found god dead upon his throne, behind |
| chooses to engage in such delusion is completely their | | | | the stone walls of heaven, Camus sought a way |
| own choice as western secularisation has largely | | | | beyond the crisis of "our darkness nihilism" (20). If an |
| removed the state's powers of coercion in such | | | | individual finds absolutely no meaning in life then from |
| affairs. Recently, with the growth of Pentecostalism | | | | some perspectives they should kill themselves. But |
| though, and other fundamentalist Christian sects, there | | | | suicide would be an absurd answer, to choose death |
| have been renewed pushes to reclaim those powers | | | | is to affirm a value in absolute nihilism and thus commit |
| for religious application. With the aim of correctly | | | | a self-contradicting act. There is no absolute nihilism as |
| understanding Human life the religious view is a | | | | such a thing is non-existent. Equally there is no eternal |
| misdirection of analytical focus and thus damaging in | | | | absolute meaning like that of the Hegelian dialectic in |
| our pursuit of answers to our riddles. | | | | the nature of life which unifies and dictates both |
| In response to this Agnosticism or Atheism is the | | | | objective and subjective meaning - there is no |
| application of Occam's razor, "if a sign is not | | | | 'objective' standard of subjective values such a thing is |
| necessary then it is meaningless" (13). The existence | | | | absurd. Camus true to his inconsistent logic of the |
| or non-existence of god is irrelevant from the | | | | absurd chose to 'rebel' against the meaninglessness by |
| standpoint of human life. If we engaged in the | | | | asserting his own relative value, all of course equally |
| entertainment of such abstractions we place ourselves | | | | absurd. If we are to judge Camus's conclusions I'm not |
| on a metaphysical treadmill, 'what comes before | | | | sure that we could fault him. His premise was not to |
| alpha?' only to redefine alpha and ask the question yet | | | | explain our nature of being in the objective sense but |
| again. | | | | rather actual experience, though he almost achieves it |
| Therefore religious faith offers up no answers for the | | | | all the same. From the stand point of understanding our |
| inquisitive mind. Søren Kierkegaard, a Christian | | | | ontological condition as human beings, he shows the |
| himself, defined faith as absolute belief in the absence | | | | absurdity of nihilism while also the inconsistency of |
| of reason on the basis of the absurd. "For he who | | | | eternal abstractions. But Absurdism misses the simple |
| loves god without faith reflects on himself, while the | | | | addition of the subjective conditions into its universal |
| person who loves god in faith reflects on god" (14). | | | | commonality of condition, or its mega-structure. |
| Abraham believed in the absence of all evidence that | | | | To miss this mega-structure, to find the notion of life's |
| god would spare his Isaac upon the mount of Moriah. | | | | meaning incomprehensible is to do so upon the notion |
| He first sacrificed his critical capacity along with his | | | | of its inventible incomprehensibility. In actuality we have |
| ethic duty to Isaac and his own emotional bond as | | | | a great body of empirical data, the annals of history |
| father to son. Choosing to follow his duty to god, thus | | | | and our own personal experience with which to |
| we have the archetype of the religious man. One | | | | answer the question, what is the meaning of life? Its |
| surely recognises this condition in the modern suicide | | | | answer is situated within the structure of empirical |
| bomber. | | | | data; the meaning of life is imbued in the very structure |
| On all grounds the religious impulse is a condition of | | | | of life. It is the very struggle for purpose and the |
| poverty offering no answers, just resignation to an | | | | affirmation of values, whether or not one individual |
| unseen father figure and a supposedly loving | | | | agrees with another's subjective affirmations is |
| relationship founded upon silence. Leaving behind the | | | | irrelevant from our perspective of ontological |
| road to Damascus we come upon the second failing | | | | investigation, from objective meaning. For our nihilistic |
| of Wittgenstein and that of inadequate philosophical | | | | mood we shall turn to psychoanalysis for some |
| systems. This is to deny the logic of a system to | | | | elucidation. According to the theory of Jacques Lacan |
| render meaning as meaningless. Philosophers such as | | | | during clinical practice the patient supposes a secret |
| Jean-Paul Sartre and the absurdists are guilty of this | | | | knowledge on the analyst. During the processes of |
| failing. | | | | analysis the subject starts to 'de-suppose' the analyst, |
| According to early work of Sartre consciousness is | | | | realising they have no secret knowledge. Losing faith in |
| immaterial thus the rules of cause and effect that | | | | their dependency on the analyst they are forced to |
| govern in the material world have its causation chain | | | | realise their own unconscious desire to remain |
| broken when an individual's volition is in play. Man is the | | | | dependent on the neurosis. The patient is therefore |
| embodiment of freedom, man chooses his path with a | | | | forced to recognise the place of personal agency in |
| free will and therefore determinism is just an | | | | pursuit of mental health. Whatever reservation one has |
| incoherent philosophic attitude of self-deceivers. | | | | in regards to Lacanian psychoanalysis, the concept |
| The anti-determinism of the existentialist leads to their | | | | helps to illustrate the nature of our question, that there |
| advocacy of subjectivism. Individuals with their | | | | is no secret knowledge, we already know but merely |
| immaterial consciousness interpret objects of the | | | | have to assert our agency to resolve the existential |
| intersujective world and then act upon them. Because | | | | crisis and the mood of absurdity. If of course that is |
| human action is subjective there is no objective human | | | | what we want at all. |
| nature and no objective meaning thus life is intrinsically | | | | Notes: |
| meaningless. Subjective meaning is affirmed on life by | | | | 1) "The Origin of Species" by Charles Darwin, (Penguin, |
| the action of the individual. Thus man's existence | | | | London 1985), page 129. |
| precedes his essence. | | | | 2) "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" by Ludwig |
| "If indeed existence precedes essence, one will never | | | | Wittgenstein, (Dover, Mineola 1999), proposition 4.121, |
| be able to explain one's actions by reference to a | | | | page 53. |
| given and specific human nature: in other words, there | | | | 3) Ibid, proposition 3.332, page 42. |
| is no determinism- man is free, man is freedom" (15). | | | | 4) Ibid, proposition 3.327, page 42. |
| With this in mind the Existentialist declares "I am thus | | | | 5) Ibid, proposition 5.6, page 88. |
| responsible for myself and for all man, and I am | | | | 6) Ibid, proposition 6.5, page 107. |
| creating a certain image of man I would have to be. In | | | | 7) Ibid, proposition 4.003, page 45. |
| fashioning myself I fashion man". | | | | 8) Ibid, proposition 5.621, page 89. |
| The existentialist states that because man is | | | | 9) Ibid, proposition 6.41, page 105. |
| responsible for himself (and humanity) he is in anguish. | | | | 10) "Writings of the young Marx on Philosophy and |
| He is in anguish because as soon as he commits to | | | | Society" (Anchor Books, Garden City 1969), page 250. |
| any act he feels the responsibility for himself and | | | | 11) Ibid. |
| humanity. The existentialist does not claim to have | | | | 12) "Civilization and its Discontents" by Sigmund Freud, |
| moral authority over humanity his subjectivism doesn't | | | | (Penguin, Suffolk 2004), page 56. |
| allow objective virtue; he declares "if I regard a certain | | | | 13) "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" by Ludwig |
| course of action as good, it is only I who choose to | | | | Wittgenstein, (Dover, Mineola 1999), proposition 3.328, |
| say that it is good and not bad" (16). There is nothing | | | | page 42. |
| for the existentialist to reference in the process of | | | | 14) "Fear and Trembling" by Søren Kierkegaard, |
| choosing right or wrong; the choice falls to what he | | | | (Penguin, St Ives 2003), page 66. |
| can live with by being responsible for its results on him | | | | 15) "Existentialism is a Humanism" by Jean-Paul Sartre, |
| and humanity. | | | | 16) Ibid. |
| Humanity during the reign of terror sent alleged | | | | 17) Ibid. |
| royalists to climb the scaffolds. Jean-Paul Marat felt his | | | | 18) "Selected Essays & Notebooks" By Albert Camus, |
| actions were that of a philanthropist, cutting off five or | | | | (penguin Aylesbury 1979), page 144. |
| six hundred heads for the benefit of humanity. In the | | | | 19) "The Myth of Sisyphus" by Albert Camus, (penguin |
| philosophical system of the Existentialist the moral | | | | Aylesbury 1983), page 44. |
| merits of this action are neither objective nor universal. | | | | 20) "Selected Essays & Notebooks" By Albert Camus, |
| What Sartre does judge though is whether or not the | | | | (penguin Aylesbury 1979), page 145. |